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QUASITRANSITIVE SOCIAL CHOICE WITHOUT THE PARETO PRINCIPLE 
INTRODUCTION 
John M. Williamson 
California Institute of Technology 
The underlying observation of this paper is that when the 
Pareto principle fails, the collection X of alternatives may be 
partitioned into a set X* of unbeatable (against at least one member 
of X) elements and its complement x� X* on which the Pareto axiom 
holds. It is then instructive to characterize the decisive, anti-
decisive and blocking coalitions for x� X* against X � X*, x� X* 
against X*, X* against X � X*, and X* against X*. Now X* itself may 
contain elements which are unbeatable with respect to alternatives 
in X*--this is to say that the Pareto axiom fails again, 
Thus X* may be partitioned into 2* * 2* (X*)* = X and X � X , 
locally on X*. 
and then the 
same analysis that was applied in the case of the partition (X*,X � X*) 
can be employed again. This process is iterated until xn* = ¢ or
x n* = x (n+l)*, for some n.
It is hoped that a characterization or classification scheme 
can be developed for sets of alternatives which are invariant under 
the * operator; such sets are exactly those in which every element of 
the set is unbeatable against at least one other member of the set. 
The main results of this paper are to be found on pages 11 and 
15. The last claim on page 11 establishes that the elements of X � X*
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can never be socially ranked above any of the elements of X*. In a similar 
vein, the final proposition stated on page 15 establishes that every 
coalition is weakly antidecisive for members of X � X* over members of X*. 
NOTATION 
N = a finite set of individuals, N c lN 
X = a set of alternatives. 
R. 
l. 
Ii, Pi 
R
Mr. i's complete, reflexive, transitive preference 
relation on X. 
indifference and strict preference for Mr. i, obtained 
from Ri. 
set of all complete, reflexive, transitive profiles 
for N on X. 
R = some one profile. 
Q set of all complete, reflexive, quasitransitive 
relations on X. 
f = a social choice function; f : R + {quasitransitive 
relations on X}. 
F the family of all such social choice functions as above. 
Rf social preference corresponding to R E R under f; 
Rf = f(R). 
If' Pf 
pc' Rc' lc 
Df(U,V) 
Af(U, V) 
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social indifference and strict preference relations 
associated with Rf. 
VR £ R, Vx, y £ X, VC _s:. N (xPcy <=> 
(Vi £ JN (i £ C => xPiy))); 
Rc and Ic are defined similarly. 
Vf £ F, VU,V _s:. X, VC _s:. N (C £ Df(U, V) <=> 
(VR £ R,  Vu £ U, Vv £ V [uPcv => uPfv] )). This is
the set of coalitions decisive for U over V. 
the set of anti-decisive coalitions for U over V; 
defined exactly as Df(U, V) above, except the 
expression in heavy square brackets should be 
replaced by [uPcv => vPfu] . 
Bf(U,V) =blocking coalitions for U over V. Defined as above 
but with [uPcv => ulfv] . 
WDf(U, V) 
WAf(U, V)
SWDf(U, V) 
SWAf(U, V) 
family of coalitions weakly decisive for U over V; 
defined as above except for making the replacement: 
[ uP c v => 1vP fu J .
weakly antidecisive coalitions; as before, but with: 
[ uP c v => --, uP f v J .
strictly weakly decisive coalitions for U over V. 
SWDf(U,V) = WDf(U, V) � Df(U,V) � Bf(U, V).
family of strictly weakly anti-decisive coalitions 
for U over V. SWAf(U,V) = WAf(U,V) � Af(U,V) � Bf(U,V). 
Df(x,y) 
PARETO f [V] 
Xf* 
x (n+l)* f 
tt<v> 
If x, y £ X, a notational abuse is entertained by 
writing Df(x,y) for Df({x}, {y}). Similarly for 
Bf(x,y), etc. 
Vf £ F, vv.::. x (PARETO f [V] <=> 
(VR £ R, Vx,y £ V(xP
N
y => xPfy))). Unless there is 
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risk of confusion the subscript "f" will be omitted. 
{x £ X J ]y £ X(x i y A Df(y,x) = ¢}. Unless there 
is risk of confusion the subscript "f" will be omitted. 
This is the set of all alternatives in X which are 
unbeatable against at least one (different than itself) 
alternative in X. 
n* n* · {x £ x f I ]y £ xf (xi y A Df(y,x) = ¢)}. Again the 
subscript will be suppressed. 
x0* = X. 
the cardinality of V. 
N.B., x l* X*, and 
!IA = f £ F is said to satisfy !IA just in case 
VR,R' £ R, Vx, y £ X (R I = R' I => \ {x,y} {x,y} 
Rf I = R' f I ) . {x,y} {x,y} 
PARETO = f £F is said to satisfy PARETO iff PARETO f [X]. 
Unless otherwise mentioned f is arbitrary f £ F 
satisfying !IA. 
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DETAILS 
The following are important, but direct, consequences of the 
definitions. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
VR £ R, Vx,y £ X(xP¢y) 
Vx £ X(¢ t Df(x,x)) 
N 
Vx £ X(Df(x,x) 
= 2 � ¢) 
PARETO [¢) 
Vx £ X(PARETO [x)) 
Df(¢,¢) 
N Df(¢,V) 
= Df(V,¢) 
= 2 , for all V c X 
Let u � X s.t. u # ¢; then ¢ t Df(u,u). Note, however, that 
if U,V � X s.t. U n  V = ¢, then it is possible that ¢£ Df(U,V)._ 
This means every element of U is strictly imposed over every 
element of V. 
U,V _'.:. X(Df(U,V) n Df(u,v) 
uEU 
vEV 
n Df(u,V) 
uEU 
n Df(U,v)) 
vEV 
Let U,V,W � X s.t. U � V; then Df(V,W) _'.:. Df(U,W), and 
Df(W,V) _'.:. Df(W,U). 
Let U,V,W, _'.:. X; then Df(U,V) n Df(V,W) :=_ Df(U,W). 
Let U,V :=_ X; then Df(U,V), Af(U,V) and Bf(U,V) are closed 
under superset in N. 
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X � X*, X � X* 
X* c X is the set of alternatives for which the Pareto axiom 
fails; an alternative lies in X* just in case it is unbeatable w.r.t. 
at least one other alternative in X. Thus X � X* may be thought of as 
having been purged of any unbeatable alternatives. Pareto holds on 
X � X* and so, therefore, Df(X � X*, X � X*) is a filter. For the 
same reasons Af(X � X*, X � X*) = ¢. 
The next four claims are direct consequences of the definitions 
but instructive nevertheless. The fifth is Hanssen's classic result. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
PARETO [X) iff X* = ¢ 
PARETO [X � X*) 
X � X* £ max {Y j PARETO [Y)} 
ycx 
If x X*, then Vn £ JN(X xn*) 
(Hanssen) If If <  X � X* > � 3, then Df(X � X*, X � X*) is a 
filter. If f also satisfies transitive range, the 
Df(X � X*, X � X*) is an ultrafilter. 
well known. 
As an aside, consider the following problem. Let u,v,w,y be 
distinct elements of X � X*; is it the case that Df(u,v) 
= Df(w,y)? 
In case Df (X � X*, X � X*) is an ultrafilter one can certainly answer 
affirmatively. However, if only quasitransitive range is assumed, 
Df(X � X*, X � X*) is merely a filter; and the problem is more complex. 
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One might consider the functions Df( •,x) : X"" X* 
and define the relation = on X"" X* by x "" y iff 
2N 
+ 2 : y + Df(y,x) 
Df( • ,x) I = Df(· ,y) I . x"'x� {x,y} x"'x� {x,y} 
Now the relation"" would partition X"" X* into finitely many equivalence-
classes. Define an associative, binary operation * on [X"" X*] = 
according to [x] * [y] = [z] iff 
Df( •, {x,y}) I =Df( •,z) I . x"'x� {x,y,z} x"'x� {x,y,z} 
A problem arises in that [X"" X*]= may fail to be *-complete; there 
simply may not be an alternative Z which is equal w.r. t. unbeatability 
as the set of alternatives {x,y}. However, X"" X* could be augmented 
so as to make [X"" X*]= *-complete. Then ( [X"" X*]=,*) would form a 
semigroup. Insofar as Df(X"-' X*, X"' X*) could be said to have been 
encoded into its associated semigroup, the large body of theorems 
addressing the taxonomy, characterization, and complexity of finite 
semigroups could be brought to bear on the nature of Df (X"" X*, X "" X*). 
Notice, for example, that if Df(X"" X*, X"" X*) is an ultrafilter, then 
[X"" X*]= is just a single equivalence class. As another example, in 
a context more general than X"" X*, if there is an alternative x £ X 
which is always strictly imposed so that Df(x,X) 
act as an identity in the semigroup ( [x],*). 
X*,X"" X* 
2N, then [x] will 
One anticipates that Df(X*,X"" X*) will be a large family; 
even puny coalitions ought to be able to carry the unbeatable 
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alternatives in X* over the beatable alternatives in X r, X*. Once it 
is established that NE Df(X*,X"" X*), closure under superset forces 
Af(X*,X"" X*) and Bf(X*,X"' X*) are empty. In this section, unless 
otherwise stated, X* and X"" X* are assumed to be non-empty. 
The following claims all have one line proofs but are 
nevertheless important. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Df(X*,X"" X*), Af(X*,X"" X*), and Bf(X*,X"" X*) are closed 
under superset in N. 
Df(X*,X"' X*), Af(X*,X"" X*), and Bf (X*,X"" X*) are mutually 
disjoint. 
Df(X*,X"" X*) # ¢ and Vx £ X*, Vy £ X"" X*(Df (x,y) # ¢).
Suppose not. Then for some x £ X*, y £ X"" X*, Df(x,y) = ¢.
But this gives y E X*, a contradiction. Local claim is now 
obvious. 
Af(X*,X"' X*) = Bf(X*,X"' X*) = ¢ and 
Vx EX*, Vy EX"' X*(Af(x,y) = Bf(x,y) = ¢).
The next several claims establish a lower bound for 
Df(X*,X"' X*). 
Suppose X* # ¢ and ft< X"' X* > ;;.  2. Let c E Df(X*,X"" X*) and 
d £ Df(X"' X*,X"" X*), then c n d £ Df(X*,X"' X*). 
•v 
X* 
•y 
•z 
X"" X* 
Choose v E X* and distinct y,z E X"" X*. Let 
RE R be given s. t. vPcndy; it is required to 
show that vPfy obtains. Construct R' s. t. the 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Claim. 
following conditions hold: 
1) 
2) 
R I = R' I and {v,y} {v,y} 
R 
c � d � d � c 
[v,y] v [v,y] 
y 
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R' 
c � d � d � c 
[v,y]R v z 
z z [v,y]R 
y 
!f.].. Notation [v,y] means the relation between v and y under 
R among the members of the coalition c � d is arbitrary. 
!f .]_. The subscript R indicates that the relation between 
v and y under the Profile R' among the members of the 
coalition shown at the column heading agrees with R. 
Now vP�z so that vPfz since c £ Df(X*,X � X*) and 
zPdy so that zP£y since d £ Df(X � X*,X � X*). 
Thus quasitransitivity gives vP£y, and by IIA vPfy obtains. 
Hence c n d £ Df(X*,X � X*), as desired. 
Df(X � X*,X � X*) � Df(X*,X � X*) where X* f. cp and It< X � X* > ;;i, 2. 
In the above claim choose C = N (recall N £ Df(X*,X � X*)) and 
let d range over the members of Df(X � X*,X � X*). In fact, 
the sharper but more obscure local result is true. 
Let X* f. cp and II < X � X* > ;;i: 2. Suppose v £ X* and distinct 
y,z £ X � X*. Then Df(Z,y) � Df (v,z). 
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Proof. Apply the technique immediately above. 
� z * 
A stronger condition gives Df (X*,X*) as a lower bound for 
Df(X*,X� X*). 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Claim. 
Let II < X* > ;;i: 2 and X � X* f. cp. Suppose there is at least 
one alternative w £ X* s.t. Df(X*,w) f. cfi. If c £ Df(X*,X*) 
and d £ Df(X*,X � X*), then c n d £ Df(X*,X � X*). 
•v
•w ·x
Let v,w £ X* and x £ X � X*. Suppose R £ R
X* ( X � X* 
is given s.t. vPcndx. Construct R' £ R s.t. 
1)
2) 
R' I = R I and {v,x} {v,x} 
R 
c � d c n d d � c 
[v,x] v [v,x] 
x 
R' 
c � d c n d 
[v,x]R v 
w 
w x 
Thus vP�w so vP£w since assumed c £ Df(X*,X*) and 
wPdx so wP£x since assumed d £ Df(X*,X � X*).
vP£x follows by quasitransitivity and IIA gives vPfx.
c n d £ Df(v,x) and arbitrariness of v,x allow 
c n d £ Df(X*,X � X*). 
d � c 
w 
[v,x]R 
Hence 
N.B. Could write a more localized version of the above 
claim. 
Suppose the conditions of the preceding claim obtain. Then 
Proof. 
1) Df(X*,X*) � Df(X*,X � X*). 
Z) If every member of Df(X*,X*) does not have nonempty 
intersection with every member of Df(X*,X � X*), then
Df(X*,X �_
X*) =ZN. 
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1) In the above claim choose d N and let c range over the 
members of Df(X*,X*). 
Z) If c n d = ¢ e: Df(X*,X � X*), closure under superset gives 
that Df(X*,X � X*) = Z
N. 
In the above note that the condition 3w e: X* s.t. Df(X*,w) # ¢
obtains if PARETO [X*] or ir X* # xZ*
Let U,V � X; recall that a coalition c � N is said to be weakly 
decisive for U over V, written c e: WDf(U,V) just in case VR e: R, Vu e: U,
Vv e: V(uPcv = >  (uPfv v uifv)). And c is said to be strictly weakly 
decisive for U over V iff c e: WDf(U,V) � Df(U,V) � Bf(U,V). Thus a 
coalition c in SWDf(U,V) will never suffer the imposition of any v e: V 
over any u e: U contrary to the coalition's strict preference. However, 
for at least one choice of u e: U, v e: V, and R e: R it must be the case 
that uPcv and uifv so that c is not decisive--c e: Df(U,V) and als� for 
at least one choice of u' e: U, v' e: V, and R' e: R, u'P�v' and u'Pfv' so 
that c is not merely blocking--c t Bf(U,V). 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Let X* # ¢, lt<x� X* > �  z and c _c:_ N. If c £ Df(X*,X� X*), 
then ce: SWDf(X*,X � X*). 
It was previously shown that Ne: Df(X*,X � X*). Let c c  N s.t. 
c e: Df(X*,X� X*) be given. Then 3R e: R, 3x e: X*, 3y e: X � X* 
lZ 
(xPcy A•xPfy). Now ,xPfy allows for two cases: i) xify and 
ii) yPfx. Observing that Bf(X*,X � X*) = ¢, if i) obtains, 
nothing remains to prove. Hence suppose ii), yPfx, is the case. 
Since assumed It< X � X* > � Z choose w e: X � X* distinct from 
y above. Construct R' e: R such that 
•x •w
1) R' I - R I {x,y} - {x,y}' Z) wP�y, and •y X* { X � X* 
3) wP�cx. Pictorially these conditions 
are: 
R R' 
.£ cc .£ cC 
x [x,y] [x,w] w 
y y [x,y]R 
Now since yPfx' IIA yields yPfx. Notice next that w,y e: X � X*,
and as previously demonstrated Pareto holds on this set. Thus 
xP�y gives wPfy. Quasitransitivity serves to establish that 
yPfx and wPfy yield wPfx. It will now be shown that
c e: Df(w,x), which is a contradiction since we: X � X*, x e: X* c 
and so as shown earlier Df(w,x) = ¢. Let R" e: R be given s.t. 
wP�cx. Observe that wP�cx and wP�cx, and also that the relation 
between x and w under R' was left unspecified w.r.t. the members 
of c. Thus R' can be constructed to satisfy not only 1) , Z), 
and 3) above but also the condition R' / 
{x,w} 
R" / 
{x,w} 
Then having established wPfx, IIA gives wP£x. Hence 
c c e: Df(w,x), which is the desired contradiction. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Suppose X* # q, and II < X � X* > � 2. Then
Df(X*,X � X*) U SWDf(X*,X � X*) = z
N. 
This is just a restatement of the previous claim. 
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Notice that SWDf(X*,X � X*) is contained within an ideal on
N. For Df (X � X*,X � X*) is a filter and is contained within 
Df(X*,X � X*). Ni SWDf(X*,X � X*) and if Df(X*,X � X*) # 2
N, then 
¢ E SWD(X*,X � X*). However, unless Df(X*,X � X*) is a filter, closure 
under union will fail. 
Conjecture--Let Y be some set of alternatives. If given 
Df(Y,Y) and SWDf(Y,Y) which are in fact dual it is possible to solve 
the backwards problem: Does the f which generated Df(Y,Y) and SWDf(Y,Y) 
satisfy transitive range, quasitransitive range, Pareto, !IA? 
(X � X*,X*) 
One expects that Df(X � X*,X*) ought to be small; few if any 
coalitions ought to be able to best an unbeatable element of X* with a 
beatable alternative in X � X*. On the other hand, it is plausible 
that one of disjoint Af(X � X*,X*) or Bf(X � X*,X*) is large. 
The sense of the next claim is that if an alternative lies in 
X*, it is unbeatable against at least one alternative in X � X*. The 
members of X* are not unbeatable simply by virtue of taking in each 
other's laundry. 
Claim. Suppose X � X*,X* = ¢ and let y E X*. Then 3x E X � X* s.t. 
Df(x,y) = q,. (Note first condition says X # X*.) 
Proof. 
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Trivial if X* is a singleton. Hence suppose II< X* > � 2. If 
the claim is false, then Vx EX� X*(Df(x,y) # ¢). Now since 
y EX* by definition 3z E X(Df(z,y) =¢ A y # z). Consider 
any v E X � X* and observe Df(z,v) # q, for otherwise v E X*. 
Since v E X � X*, assuming the claim false gives that 
Df(v,y) # ¢. Closure of decisive families under superset allows 
in particular that NE Df(z,v), NE Df(v,y). Thus 
NE Df(z,v) n Df(v,y) :=_ Df(z,y) =¢, a· contradiction. 
This claim can be universalized as below: 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Suppose X � X*,X* # q,. Then Vx EX� X*, Vy E X*(Df(x,y) = ¢). 
Suppose not. As above, since y EX*, 3v E X � X* such that 
Df(v,y) = ¢. The negation of the claim allows some x Ex� X* 
s.t. Df(x,y) # q,. Since v,x EX� X* and Pareto [X � X*], 
Df(v,x) # ¢. In particular N E Df(v,x) n Df(x,y) 5=_ Df(v,y) 
a contradiction. 
q,, 
And these.local claims can be trivially globalized to give: 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Df(X � X*,X*) ¢, where X � X*,X* # q,. 
Df(X X*,X*) = n Df(x,y) xex�x* 
yEX* 
n q, 
xex�x* 
yeX* 
¢, as desired. 
In what follows, suppose that X* # ¢ and If< X � X* > � 2. We
now seek to characterize Bf(X � X*,X*) and Af(X � X*,X*). An important 
unresolved problem is to develop interesting conditions which guarantee 
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NE Bf(X,...., X*,X*) or NE Af(X,...., X*,X*), these two sets being disjoint. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Bf(X,...., X*,X*) n Af(X,...., X*,X*) = ¢ 
Obvious; suppose not. 
l;fv,w E X(Af(v,w) = ¢ => (N E Df(v,w) v N E Bf(v,w))) 
Suppose not. 
Now Af(v,w) 
Then Af(v,w) = ¢ but N i Df(v,w) and N E Bf(v,w). 
by 
¢=>Ni Af(v,w)IIA> l;/R E R(vPNw A1wPfv). 
N i Df(v,w) and N i Bf(v,w) give, again by !IA, that 
l;/R E R(vPNw A-ivPfw A•vlfw). But this violates completeness 
of social preference. 
Af(X,...., X*,X*) = ¢ => N E Bf(X,...., X*,X*) 
Recall Df(X"' X*,X*) = ¢ and apply the above claim. 
Let c � N, if c i Af(X,...., X*,X*); then c E WAf(X,...., X*,X*). 
•w I
f c i Af(X X*,X*), then 
.•x 
·y 3R ER, 3x EX*, 3y EX,...., X*(yPcx A-ixPfy). X* ( X"' X* 
Thus either i) xlfy or ii) yPfx. Should i) 
obtain, there is nothing to prove; so suppose ii) is the case. 
Construct R' E R s.t. 1)
2) R 
.£ cC 
y [x,y] 
x 
RI = R' I and 
{x,y} {x,y} 
R' 
.£ 
w 
y 
x 
cc 
w 
[x,y] 
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Since yPfx, !IA gives yP£x. Recall that Pareto holds on X,...., X* 
so that wP£Y· By quasitransitivity then wP£x. Now xP{f so by 
!IA l;/R" E R(wP!(c => xPJ;x). Thus N E Df(w,x) which is a 
contradiction since w E X,...., X*, x E X* require Df(w,x) = ¢, as 
was previously shown. 
The preceding development will allow the following rather weak character-
ization of Bf(X"' X*,X*). Note in the quasitransitive case Bf(X,...., X*,X*) 
is not in general a filter. 
Claim. Let c � N. c If c E Bf(X,...., X*,X*), then c E WAf(X,...., X*,X*) and 
c c E SWDf(X*,X,...., X*). 
Proof. Shown previously: 
i) c If c E Bf(X,...., X*,X*), then c i Af(X,...., X*,X*); and 
ii) c If c i Af(X,...., X*,X*), then c c E WAf(X ,._., X*,X*); 
If c E Bf(X,...., X*,X*), then c c E WAf(X,...., X*,X*). 
Also have shown 
iii) If c E Bf(X,...., X*,X*), then cc i Df(X*,X ,._., X*); and 
iv) c If c i Df(X*,X ,._., X*), then c c E SWDf(X*,X,...., X*); 
If c E Bf(X ,._., X*,X*), then c c E SWDf(X*,X,...., X*). 
The two conclusions above form the conjunction claimed. 
The following claims bear upon the characterization of Af(X,...., X*,X*). 
·Note since X,...., X* n X* = ¢, there is no necessary contradiction if 
¢ E Af(X�, X*,X*). 
Claim. Suppose ff< X,...., X* > ;;i: 2 and X* f. ¢, then Af(X,...., X*,X*) is 
closed under intersection. 
Proof. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
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Trivial if Af(X� X*,X*) = ¢, so suppose it' s not empty. 
•x l ·y I 
Let c,d E Af(x� X*,X*), x Ex� X*, y EX*, 
•z and R E R s.t. xP Then construct 
X � X* X* c d
y.
R' E R such that 
R R' 
c � d c n d d,...., c c � d c n d d,...., c 
[x,y] x [x,y] z z z 
y [x,y]R x [x,y]R 
y 
Now zP�y so yPfz since c E Af(X � X*,X*); 
and zPNx so zPfx since PARETO [X� X*]. Quasitransitivity 
gives therefore yPfx and by IIA yPfx obtains. Thus 
c n d E Af(X,...., X*,X*) as desired. 
Suppose It< X � X* > ;;,, 2 and X* ¢, then Af(X � X*,X*) is closed 
w.r.t. complementation in N. 
Trivial if Af(X � X*,X*) = ¢; hence suppose nonempty. Referring 
to the diagram of the previous proof, let c E Af(X,...., X*,X*), 
x EX� X*, y EX*, and RE R s.t. xPccY· Then construct 
R' E R such that 
R R' 
c c 
.£ c .£ c 
[x,y] x z z 
y [x,y]R x 
y 
Claim. 
Proof. 
X*,X* 
Now zP�y so yPfz since c E Af(X � X*,X*); 
zPNx so zPfx since PARETO [X,...., X*]. 
Quasitransitivity gives yPfx, and IIA allows yPfx. 
Thus cc E Af(X � X*,X*), as desired. 
N Af (X � X*, X*) = ¢ or 2 , where It< X ,...., X* > ;;,, 2 and X* # ¢.
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If Af(X,...., X*,X*) # ¢, then closure under superset in N gives 
NE Af(X � X*,X*). Closure under complementation gives 
¢ E Af(X,...., X*,X*) so closure under superset gives 
Af(X,...., X*,X*) = 2
N, since. every set is a superset of ¢.
Having culled the unbeatable alternatives into X*, one can 
consider this set not only against the background of X but also as a 
collection of alternatives in its own right. Such a viewpoint immedi-
ately leads one to ask: Does Pareto hold among the members of X*, and 
what do Af, Bf, and Df look like on X*? In order to answer these 
questions one can apply the * operator to X* itself and partition the 
set into (X*)* = x 2* and X*� x 2*. The analysis of the previous pages 
can then be employed anew; however, it will still remain to analyze 
the decisive, blocking, and antidecisive coalitions on x 2*. But why 
not put off this misery yet again? 
so on. How does this process end? 
2* n* Claim. X :::i X* :::i X :::i • • • :::i X :::i 
Claim. PARETO [x
n*J => X(n+l)* = ¢
Apply * to x 2*, partition it, and 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Claim. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Claim. 
II < xn* > 1 => x(n+l) * = c/l 
Let xn* = {x}. ]y E x s. t. Df(y,x) = cfi. 
n* fu+l)* n* Suppose X = ]{'"- , then �m E lN(m � n => X x111*) • 
X(n+
2)* 
= (X(n+l)*)* n* (n+l)* n
* 
(X )* = X = X . Proceed by 
induction . 
x � x*_::. X 
x" { I t " D D x3* lx2*�x3* 
+ " 
X � J?-*_::. X* 
+ " 
D D I X* � x2* + " 
x2*�x3* c x2* 
X* 
Where U � D � V means U n V = c/l 
n* (n+l)* (n+l)* Suppose II <  X � X > � 2 and X f. cfi. 
X � X* 
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Then Df(xn* � X(n+l)
*, xn* � X(n+l)*) _::. Df(X(n+l)*, �* � X(n+l)*). 
By induction. Shown previously that 
Df(X � X*,X � X*) _::. Df(X*,X � X*). 
Df(X,X) _::. Df(X � X*,X � X*) 
1 � 2* 3* nl 
c. 
'l. Df(X*,X � X*) ::_Df(X ,X � X*) ::_Df(X ,X � X*) . . . .
/ 2* 2* Df(X*,X*) _::. Df (X* � X ,X* � X ) 
0'1 2* 2* 3* 2* 4* 2* n1 'l. Df(X ,X* � X ) ::_Df(X ,X* � X ) _::.Df(X ,X*�X ) . . . .
c. 
2* 2* / 2* 3* 2* 3* Df(X ,X ) .=. D (X �x ,X �x ) 
{;,l 3* 2* 3* 4* 2* 3* 5* 2* 3*Df(x ,x �x ) .=.nfcx ,x �x ) .=.nf(x ,x �x ) . . .  
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Where the _::.1 and _::.2 containments are subject to the following 
(n+l)* n* (n+l)* provisos: If /I < X > � 2 and X � X f. cfi and also 
(n+l)* (n+l)* 3w E X such that Df(X ,w) f. ¢, then 
Df(X(n+l)*,x(n+l)*) _::.
2 
Df(X(n+l)*,xn* �x(n+l)*).
Consider what happens as * is iterated on X; suppose nonempty 
n* n* X has been generated. The next action by * will purge X of those 
alternatives which are unbeatable only against some alternative(s) 
outside of xn*, in X(n-l)*. The elements surviving the purge are exactly 
those which are unbeatable against some alternative which is itself a 
n* member of X . This new elite collection forms X(n+l)*. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
Df(xn*,x(n+l)*) c/l and N E D (X(n+l)* n* f ,x ) 
Exactly analogous to the case n = 0. The first equation holds 
since every member of X(n+l)* is unbeatable against some member 
n* (n+l)* n* X , and so X _::. X . 
(n+l)* n* let x E X and y E X ; 
In case of the second statement, 
if Df(x,y) = ¢, then y E X(n+l)* __ 
a contradiction. Since x and y were arbitrary, N E Df(X
(n+l)*,X1*). 
(n+2)* n* Let i,n ElN and i � l; then NE Df(X ,X ). 
Shown above the claim holds for i = 1. Suppose as an inductive 
hypothesis that the result is true for i = m. Consider the
consequences if the claim fails for i = m + 1:
N ¢ Df(X(n+m+l)�xn*) => 3x E X
(n+m+l)� 3y E Xn*(N ¢ Df(x,y)). 
Closure under superset of decisive families then requires 
Df(x,y) = cfi. 
x E x(n+m)* , 
By definition, X(n+m+l)* _::. X(n+m)* so that 
(n+m)* n* but then NE Df(X ,X ) requires NE Df(x,y), 
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a contradiction. 
As * is repeatedly iterated, several scenarios might eventually 
ensue: 
1) n* Pareto holds on some X so that ¢ x (n+l) * = x <n+2) * = . • . , 
where II< xn* > � 2. 
2) n* For some n, X (n+l)* {x} so X = ¢, n � 1.
3) xn* = x <n+l)* n* and X is nonempty. 
4) xn* J x <n+l)* J x <n+2)* J # # # Pareto never holds, and the 
chain continues nontrivially, forever. 
A moment's reflection serves to establish that the four cases 
2* above are exhaustive. For X c X* c X c . As the elements of - -
the chain get smaller, either the empty set must appear, two adjacent 
elements must be equal in which case all succeeding elements are 
identical, or else the chain must continue nontrivially, forever. 
Claim. n* In cases 3), 4) Pareto does not hold on any X , n � 0 
so that ¢ = Df(X,X) = Df(X*,X*) 
Df(x
n*,x n*) 
2* 2* Df(X ,X ) = • • •  
Case 3) places a limit on the usefulness of the * construction; 
in this case X contains a set of elements each of which is unbeatable 
against some other alternative in the set. The most drastic version of 
this scenario occurs if every member of x n* is unbeatable against every 
other member of x n*. These appear to be quite complex situations, and 
no analysis of them has been undertaken here. Case 2) is actually just 
the degenerate instance of 3). (n+l)* The reason that X = ¢ instead of 
x <n+l)* x n* as in 2) is that unbeatability of an alternative, as 
defined herein, requires unbeatability against a distinct second 
alternative. Hence a singleton cannot contain any unbeatable 
alternatives. 
Recall earlier that the conditions II< X* > � 2 and 
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3w E X*(Df)X*,w) # ¢) were employed to show Df(X*,X*) � Df(X*,X"" X*) 
where X"" X* # ¢· Trivially in case 3) and 4) Df(X*,X*) = ¢ so the 
claim obtains regardless of the conditions. In case 2), where xn* = {x}, 
if n > 1, then Df(X*,X*) = ¢ and the claim again holds trivially; if 
n = 1, X* = {x} so Df(X*,X*) = 2
N"" ¢ and it cannot be asserted from the 
previous development that 2N rv ¢ � Df (X*,X "" X*) . In case 1) there is 
a collection of two or more alternatives in X* such that Pareto holds 
among them. Then, just as it was shown Df(X*,X*) � Df(X*,X"" X*), it 
can be shown n* n* n* that Df(X ,X ) � Df(X*,X"" X*). If ll<X > �  3 then 
Df(x
n*,x n*) is a filter; and the collegium composed of its generating 
set can not only dictate social preference on xn* but also between X* 
and X rv X*. � � � In fact Df(X ,X ) � Df(X ,X), which will give that 
Df(x
n*,x n*) n* Df(X ,X), as developed below. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
n* n* Suppose case 1) holds for X , that is to say II< X > � 2 and 
n* Pareto [X ], then the following hold: 
i) n* n* n* Df(X ,x ) � Df(X*,X rv X*) � Df(X ,x rv X*) 
ii) Df(x
n*,x n*) = Df(x
n*,x *) 
�* n* n* iii) Df( ,X ) = Df(X ,X) 
i) The first containment was shown for n = 1 previously; the 
extension to Pareto holding on xn* instead is trivial. The 
second containment holds since x n* c X*. 
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n* n* n* n* n* n* ii) Df(X ,X ) 5:_ Df(X ,X ) since X 5:_ X . 
n* n* n* Df (X ,X ) 5:_ Df (X ,X*) will be shown by induction. 
n* n* n* n-1)* First we will establish that Df(X ,X ) 5:_ Df(X ,X ). 
Choose any c 
xn* •x ·y n* x £ x ' z £ 
n* n* £ Df (X ,X ) and let
(n-1)* X . Trivially 
(n-1)* n* x � x  ·z n* c £ Df(x,z) if z £ X so take 
x(n-1) * z £ X(n-l)* � xn*. Let R £ R
be given such that xPcz, and construct R' £ R such that 
and 
R R' 
..£ cC ..£ CC 
x [x,z] x y 
z y [x,z] R 
z 
n* n* Now xP�y so that xPfy since c £ Df(X ,X ) by assumption, 
, n* (n-1)* yPNz so that yPfz since N £ Df(X ,X ) , as 
previously shown. Therefore by quasitransitivity xPfz and by 
n* (n-1)* IIA c £ Df(x,z). Arbitrariness then gives c £ Df(X , X ) . 
n* (n-m) * Suppose as an inductive hypothesis that c £ Df(X ,X ), 
n* (n-m-1)* for m < n. Required now to show that c £ Df(X ,X ) . 
n* (n-m-1)* (n-m)* To this end let x £ X , v £ X , and u £ X . If 
·x 
xn* I •u 
x<n-m)* 
•v
( n-m-1) ( n-m) * x � x 
x<n-m-1)* 
(n-m)* v £ X , c £ Df(x,v) directly 
from the inductive hypothesis. 
Hence suppose that 
(n-m-1)* (n-m)* v £ X � X . Let 
R £ R be given s.t. xPcv and 
construct R' £ R such that 
on X*. 
Claim. 
Proof. 
R R' 
..£ cc ..£ 
x [x,v] x 
v u 
v 
- - n* (n-m)* Now xP�u gives that xPfu since c £ Df(X ,X ) 
- -
inductive hypothesis. uP�v gives that uPfv since 
cC 
u 
[x,v] R 
by the 
(n-m)* (n-m-1)* N £ Df(X ,X ), as demonstrated earlier. By 
quasitransitivity xP£v obtains, and IIA gives xPfv so that 
c £ Df(x,v); and again arbitrariness of x,v allows 
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n* (n-m-1)* c £ Df(X ,X ). Since c was arbitrary, the conclusion 
n* n* n* (n-m-1)* can be universalized to give Df(X ,X ) 5:_ Df(X , X ), 
where m < n. In particular this is true for m = n - z, in 
n* n* n* which case Df(X ,X ) � Df(X ,X*). 
iii) O* As above but choose m = n - 1, and recall X = X . 
Lastly, antidecisive and blocking families are considered 
Suppose case 1) obtains. Then Af(X*,X*) = Bf(X*,X*) 
= ¢.
Suppose Af(X*,X*) # ¢, then N £ 
then �R £ R, xPNy => yPfx. But 
n* Af(X*,X*). Let x,y £ X , 
�� N £ Df(X ,x ) => N £ Df(x,y) 
=> (xPNy => xPfy), which is a contradiction. Similarly for 
Bf(X*,X*).
It clearly will be important in this line of inquiry to 
n* n* n* n* investigate Bf(X ,X ), Af(X ,X ) in case 3). It might be easiest 
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to start with the simplest version of case 3), that is, where 
n* �x,y £ X (Df(x,y) = ¢). 
n* In this case then �x,y £ X (N £ Af(x,y) v 
N £ Bf(x,y)). 
n* n* The set of ordered pairs X x X can then be
partitioned according as N £ Af(x,y) or N £ Bf(x,y)--both cannot occur. 
This will hardly be an equivalence relation in the quasitransitive case, 
but a few pleasant properties do obtain. The A half of the relation 
is its own transitive closure for N £ Af(w,x) and N £ Af(x,z) imply 
N £ Af(w,z). Things are not so pleasant regarding syrmnetry or 
transitivity. This is the approach of Wilson; but without transitive 
range, the analysis of "Social Choice without the Pareto Principle" 
is less penetrating. 
